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The Netherlands:  










The Netherlands has seen a considerable decline of the period total fertility rate and 
delayed  childbearing,  just  like  all  other  European  countries.  The  drop  in  fertility, 
however, has not been as sharp as in many other regions of Europe. The period total 
fertility rate in the Netherlands has stabilized since the late 1970s at around 1.6 children 
per  woman,  and  it  has  even  risen  slightly  since  1995.  In  addition,  although  the 
Netherlands has one of the oldest first-time mothers, completed fertility is still rather 
high compared to other European countries, suggesting a strong “catching up” of births 
by women in their thirties. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the main 
driving forces behind specific fertility trends in the Netherlands. Among other factors, it 
focuses  on  changing  patterns  of  home  leaving  and  union  formation,  declining 
partnership  stability,  and  the  growing  acceptability  and  use  of  contraception.  The 
chapter also looks at prolonged education, rising labor-force participation of women, 
economic  uncertainties,  the  growing  migrant  population,  and  family  policies.  Data 
allowing,  and  to  the  extent  possible,  we  examine  the  effects  of  these  factors  on 
decision-making about parenthood and the timing of childbearing. 
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1. Introduction  
In 2005, the Netherlands had a registered population of 16.3 million. With 484 persons 
per square kilometers, it is the second most densely populated country in the EU after 
Malta.  Over  the  last  century,  the  population  of  the  Netherlands  has  risen  by  about 
100,000 people a year. Nevertheless, population growth has been slowing down rapidly 
since 2000 due to a declining number of births, falling numbers of immigrants, and 
rising numbers of emigrants. In 2005, the population grew by only 30,000 persons, 
which is the lowest level of growth recorded since 1900. Current projections (base year 
2006) by Statistics Netherlands expect growth to remain close to zero in the coming 
decades (Garssen and Van Duin 2006). After 2035, the population size is expected to 
decline at a rate of some 15,000 persons a year. 
Around 1970, the Netherlands experienced a substantial decline in the number of 
births. The period of high fertility (the so called “baby boom”) after the end of the 
Second  World  War  ended  in  the  late  1960s.  Between  1969  and  1975,  births  were 
reduced by a third. Within a decade (1965–1975), the period total fertility rate fell from 
3.04,  conspicuously  higher  than  the  European  average,  to  1.66,  below  the  EU–15 
average. Declining fertility in the Netherlands, however, came to a halt in the mid-
1970s and even a slight recovery has been observed since 1995. However, the fertility 
rate has never been above replacement since 1973. 
As  a  direct  result  of  the  sharp  drop  and  subsequent  stabilization  in  fertility, 
together with lower mortality, the Dutch population has been steadily aging, and this 
will continue in the near future (see Figure 1). The proportion of people aged 65 or over 
increased by 1.2 percentage points each decade. Currently, 14% of the population is 65 
years old or over. In 2010, when the baby-boom generation will start to reach the age of 
65, aging is expected to accelerate to a rate of 4 percentage points each decade. The 
period of aging is projected to end around 2040, when 24% of the population will be 65 
years old or over. In the decades after 2040, the percentage of elderly is expected to 
fluctuate around this level.  
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Figure 1:  (Continued)  Population age structure of the Netherlands,  













-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14




males females Pyramid        2040
 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
 
 
In  addition  to  declining  fertility,  the  mean  age  of  mothers  at  first  birth  has 
drastically increased. For many years now, the Netherlands have had the oldest first-
time mothers in the world. The mean age at first birth rose from 24.8 years in 1970 to 
28.9 years in 2004. Although Dutch women have postponed childbearing more than in 
almost any other European country (only Spain had a higher mean age at first birth, 
29.3, in 2004), women in the Netherlands also displayed a pronounced “catching up” of 
delayed births after age 30. Accordingly, women who have completed their families 
(now in their late 40s) had 1.87 (born in 1957) to 1.85 (born in 1960) children on 
average, which is quite high compared to other European countries. 
The rapid descent from high post-war fertility and delayed childbearing after the 
1960s follows the pattern generally observed in Western Europe and are symptomatic 
of the Second Demographic Transition. Whereas the main characteristics of the First 
Demographic Transition (at the beginning of the last century) are a drop in mortality 
levels  and  a  decline  in  birth  rates,  the  second  transition  has  brought  about  major 
changes in family formation and partnership relations. Essential features of the Second 
Demographic  Transition  are  the  postponement  of  major  conventional  union Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org   747 
commitments and transitions (e.g., delayed marriage, the postponement of leaving the 
parental home), lower levels of commitment between partners (e.g., replacing marriage 
by  cohabitation  or  other  unconventional  living  arrangements),  more  egalitarian 
relationships between partners, and a lower stability of partnerships (Lesthaeghe and 
Van de Kaa 1986, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988, Van de Kaa 1987). These changes are 
explained by socio-economic as well as cultural shifts in society (Liefbroer and Dykstra 
2000). Since the mid-1960s, contraceptive use has become increasingly widespread and 
more efficient, thus weakening fertility desires. The latter was also impacted by rising 
educational  attainment  and  the  growing  participation  of  women  in  the  labor  force. 
Changes  in  norms,  values,  and  attitudes  toward  union  formation  and  (gender  roles 
within)  partner  relationships  as  well  as  parenthood  and  first  birth  timing  have 
contributed to this change in fertility. Processes of emancipation, individualization and 
secularization have fuelled these changes in values (Beck 1990, Lesthaeghe and Van de 
Kaa 1986). 
The Dutch “Poldermodel” helps us to understand why completed fertility in the 
Netherlands is still rather high by European standards. This successful consensus-model 
of the 1990s is based on the fact that employers, trade unions, and the government 
tackle  socio-economic  problems  together.  Through  agreement  on  wage  restraint, 
adjustments  to  the  social  security  system,  and  the  development  of  an  active  labor 
market  policy,  the  economic  crisis  of  the  1980s
5  (“the  Dutch  disease”)  turned  into 
economic  recovery  in  the  1990s  (“the  Dutch  miracle”),  seeing  one  of  the  lowest 
unemployment rates in Europe (5.7% in 1997). Consensus on wage restraint was gained 
in exchange for more part-time and flexible jobs. Together with an expansion of child-
care  services,  these  arrangements  facilitated  childbearing  and  employment 
compatibility among women (Liefbroer 1999).  
The aim of this chapter is to give a comprehensive overview of the expected main 
driving  factors  behind  specific  fertility  trends  and  the  current  situation  in  the 
Netherlands. After a detailed description of fertility trends among the Dutch population, 
Section 3 examines family changes that have influenced fertility. Section 4 focuses on 
family planning by looking at changes in contraceptive and abortion behavior. Trends 
in social and cultural conditions and their association with fertility are the main focus of 
Section  5,  concentrating  on  the  fertility  impact  of  the  business  cycle  as  well  as 
immigration. Section 6 deals with major family policy measures, current and preferred, 
and their perceived effects on fertility. The chapter ends with a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
 
                                                            
5 The economic crisis was marked by low economic growth, high unemployment, a high influx of disabled 
employees, and a high burden of taxation. Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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2. Fertility trends  
2.1 Period and cohort fertility  
Figure  2  compares  the  Total  Period  Fertility  Rate  (TPFR)  for  each  calendar  year 
between 1950 and 2004 and the ultimate level of fertility of cohorts (TCFR) aged 29 in 
that year (the average age at childbearing in the 1975–2004 period). As the ultimate 
number of children for young generations is not yet observed, the figures on cohort 
fertility are partly based on the most recent Dutch population projections produced by 




Figure 2:  TPFR and TCFR (cohort + 29 years), the Netherlands,  
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Source: Computations based on CBS Statline database 
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The TPFR sharply declined in the Netherlands since the mid-1960s and fell below 
the replacement level (2.1) in 1973. It reached its lowest level in 1983, 1.47 children per 
woman. During the following decade, it stabilized and slightly reversed, ranging from 
1.49 to 1.62 children per woman. Since 1995, the Netherlands has even been witnessing 
an increase in the TPFR to the current (2004) level of 1.73 children per woman. The 
recent trend sharply contrasts the persistent TPFR declines in Southern, Central, and 
Eastern  Europe  to  levels  below  1.3  children  per  woman.  Nonetheless,  in  the 
Netherlands  the  TPFR  has  been  well  below  replacement  level  for  more  than  three 
decades. 
A substantial decline in cohort fertility started for women born after 1921, falling 
from 2.9 children to below replacement from the 1943 cohort onwards. Cohort fertility 
has declined only slightly across cohorts born between 1950 and 1975, however, from 
1.9 to 1.8 children. Although the fertility of the cohorts from about 1965 onwards is still 
rather uncertain (these women have not yet finished their reproductive life), there are no 
indications for a strong downward or upward trend of their TCFR. Thus, the oscillations 
in the TPFR in the 1980s and 1990s, which were partly affected by the business cycle 
(see below), did not produce significant changes in completed cohort fertility. In other 
words, the fluctuations in the TPFR have been due to changes in the timing of fertility 
rather than changes in the ultimate level of fertility. 
 
 
2.2 Family size  
Figure 3 shows the TPFR broken down by birth order for the period 1950–2004. The 
sharp decline of the fertility rate between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s was almost 
exclusively caused by the virtual “disappearance” of large families. In 1960, 17% of all 
births were of third order and no less than 26% of fourth or higher order. By 2004, 
however, third-order births declined to 12% and fourth or higher-order births were only 
5% of all births. 
 Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
750    http://www.demographic-research.org 














































Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
 
The reduction in large family sizes can also be noted when looking at cohort parity 
distribution and parity progression ratios among women born between 1935 and 1965 
(Figures 4 and 5). Most notably, among these cohorts the percentage of women with 
four or more children has continuously declined (from 38 to 10%) and the two-child 
family has become increasingly popular (an increase from 33 to 50%). The progression 
rates to third and fourth-order birth have dropped from 0.46 to 0.22 and from 0.38 to 
0.10, respectively. Starting from the post-war generations, the proportion of two-child 
families has decreased slightly while there has been a steady rise in the proportion of 
childless women. Whereas 12% of the 1935 female cohort had no children, 18% of the 
1965  cohort  is  estimated  to  remain  childless.  However,  note  that  the  rise  in 
childlessness is less pronounced than was expected some 15 years ago. The projections 
in the 1980s, suggesting a rise in childlessness to 25%, turned out to be too high. A 
large  majority  of  Dutch  women  ultimately  and  at  ever-increasing  ages  (see  next 
subsection) opt to have at least one child. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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2.3 Age at motherhood  
Dutch  women  have  one  of  the  highest  ages  at  first  birth  worldwide.  In  2003,  the 
average age at which they had a child was 30.4 years compared to 29.5 years in EU–15. 
Since 1950, the mother’s mean age at childbirth has dropped initially, but started to rise 
from 1971 onwards for first-born babies, narrowing the timeframe for fertility (Figure 
6). Since 1970, the mean age at first birth has increased by more than 4 years, from 24.8 
to  28.9  years  in  2004.  The  trend  towards  delayed  childbearing  contributed  to  a 
substantial  decline  in  the  TPFR  in  the  1970s  (see  Figure  2).  Whereas  the  sharp 
reduction in the TPFR between 1965 and 1975 was caused by TCFR decline among the 
1935–1945 cohorts, the development of the TPFR since 1975 has mainly been affected 
by changes in the timing of childbearing rather than by changes in the TCFR. Until the 
mid-1990s, the TPFR remained more or less constant due to declining fertility at young 
ages from the first half of the 1970s onwards on the one hand, and rising fertility at  
 
 
Figure 6:  Mean age of women at childbirth by birth order, the Netherlands,  
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older ages on the other (see Figure 7). At the same time, the TPFR has constantly been 
lower than the TCFR. In the mid-1990s, the decline of fertility rates at young ages came 
to  an  end,  but  fertility  increase  at  older  ages  has  been  continuing  since.  As  a 
consequence, the TPFR started to rise in the mid-1990s and approached the fertility 
level of cohorts around the turn of the century. 
The trend towards delayed childbearing and towards narrowing the timeframe for 
fertility is illustrated best by comparing age-specific fertility rates across a number of 
years (see Figure 8). In the period 1950–1970, fertility rates increased among women at 
prime childbearing ages and declined among women at older ages. In 1970, fertility 
reached highest levels at ages 25–26. In the next decade, fertility rates declined at both 
younger and older ages, with a lower fertility level and a less pronounced peak at ages 
26–27 in 1980. Since then, fertility rates at younger ages have further been declining, 
while the fertility of women aged 30 and above has risen. As a result, the peak in 
fertility rates has shifted to ages 29–31. 
Figure 2 shows that completed fertility has hardly declined for cohorts born after 
1950.  Thus,  the  postponed  childbearing  of  cohorts  born  in  the  1960s  has  been 
compensated almost fully by rising fertility rates at higher ages. Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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Figure 8:  Age-specific fertility rates among women aged 15–45, the  























































2.4 Teenage pregnancy  
As contraceptive use became more widespread in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see 
Section 4.1), the teenage birth rate began to fall drastically (Figure 9). While in 1970, 
23 of 1000 women aged 15–19 gave birth, 5 to 6 did so in the late 1980s. In the early 
and second half of the 1990s, teenage fertility rose temporarily but noticeably. Because 
of renewed attention to preventing teenage pregnancies, the birth rate among teenagers 
has been falling again since 2002 (Garssen 2005). For years now, the Netherlands has 
been one of the countries with the lowest rates of teenage motherhood. 
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Figure 9:  Birth rates per 1000 teenage women by age, the Netherlands, 




























































Source: Computations based on CBS Statline database 
 
 
Preventive  measures  prove  to  be  most  effective  among  very  young  women 
(Garssen 2006). In addition, the recent decline in teenage fertility was largely caused by 
a relatively sharp fall in the birth rate among foreign-born girls. Nevertheless, the risk 
of teenage motherhood among girls with a non-western background is still much higher 
than among native Dutch teenagers. In 2001, for example, the former were more than 6 
times as likely to have a baby, and in 2004 they were 4.5 times as likely (Garssen 
2005). Within the group of non-western girls, however, there are striking differences by 
ethnic origin (Figure 10). While the majority of teenage mothers with a Turkish or 
Moroccan background are married and 19 years old at first childbirth, Surinamese and 
Antillean/Aruban teenage mothers are often unmarried and younger. 
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Figure 10:  Teenage motherhood by age and ethnicity, the Netherlands, 2004  
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2.5 Extramarital fertility  
Figure 11 shows extramarital births as a proportion of all live births. The Netherlands 
had a rather stable percentage of births out of wedlock until the early 1970s, lower than 
in  most  other  European  countries.  After  1975,  however,  a  sharp  increase  can  be 
observed.  In  1975, 2.1% of  children  were  born  outside  marriage,  whereas  in  2004, 
32.5%  of  all  live  births  were  outside  marriage.  Besides  the  higher  proportion  of 
extramarital births currently seen, there is another important difference to the past. In 
the 1960s and the early 1970s, these “illegitimate” children were mainly born to young 
single women with a low level of education who had not planned to become pregnant. 
Today, most of the children born to unmarried mothers are born within a relationship, 
usually to a couple in their late 20s or early 30s who have made a conscious decision to 
have a child and obviously do not (yet) see the necessity to marry. The proportion of 
extramarital births is considerably higher among first children than among second or 
later children. Many unmarried couples enter into marriage after the birth of their first 
child. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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Figure 11:  Extramarital births as a percentage of all live births,  


































































Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
 
3. Life course transitions  
3.1 Leaving the parental home  
In the Netherlands as well as in other industrialized countries, the patterns of leaving 
home  have  changed  considerably  during  the  past  decades.  Until  the  1960s,  leaving 
home and marriage were very much related. At the end of the 1960s, two-thirds of 
young  adults  left  the  parental  home  to  enter  marriage  or  cohabitation,  while 
independence was the main reason for only 5% of home leavers. In 2000–2002, four of 
ten young adults left the parental home to live together or to marry, with independence 
having been the main reason for one quarter of young adults. Leaving the parental home 
without a clear necessity but for reasons of independence thus became more important 
over time, resulting in an increasing number of young adults who live on their own for a 
certain period of time after they have moved out of the parental home (Liefbroer 1999).  Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
758    http://www.demographic-research.org 
Together with the growing importance attached to independence, the median age at 
which young adults leave the parental home has declined. This applies in particular to 
the 1941–1960 cohorts (Liefbroer and Dykstra 2000). For young adults born after 1960, 
the trend reversed: They stayed with their parents longer, resulting in higher ages of 
leaving home in the 1980s and 1990s. Among the factors that have contributed to this 
delay are an increase in the age of completing secondary education, smaller families, 
larger houses, greater parental tolerance towards their children, and the financial burden 
of starting a one-person household (Van Hoorn 2001). At the beginning of this century, 
however, the age of home leaving decreased again, among other factors possibly as the 
result of low youth unemployment. Cohort analyses by Liefbroer and Dykstra (2000) on 
patterns of leaving home furthermore show that the time span in which young adults 
leave the parental home has been narrowing in the cohorts born since 1900: The age is 
more compressed for cohorts born after 1941.  
On average, Dutch girls are leaving home at a younger age than boys, a pattern 
that  has  been  observed  for  several  decades  (Figure  12).  While  most  Dutch  girls  
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currently leave their parental home at around 20–21 years of age, most boys do so two 
years later (Van Hoorn 2001). In addition, the lower their education, the longer do 
young adults stay with their parents. Vocational college and university are often not 
situated in the neighborhood of their parental home and this may be one of the reasons 
why young people pursuing higher education leave home at a younger age on average. 
 
 
3.2 Unmarried cohabitation and marriage  
Among people born before 1950, the large majority started to live with their partner 
within  the  context  of  a  married  union.  Among  subsequent  cohorts,  unmarried 
cohabitation  with a partner became ever  more important.  Of all  young people born 
between 1961 and 1970, 69% started to live with a first partner in an unmarried union 
(Liefbroer and Dykstra 2000). Today, the majority of young adults start their relational 
career with cohabitation. In 2005, 67% of 20–29-year-old couples cohabited compared 
to  49%  among  the  same  age  group  ten  years  earlier.  Even  though  unmarried 
cohabitation is now widely accepted and increasingly viewed as a suitable alternative to 
marriage, most of the young couples ultimately get married. This is especially the case 
when they want to become or just have become parents (Alders and De Graaf 2001). As 
a result, the percentage of cohabiting couples is reduced to 31% among those aged 30–
39 years (2005).  
Data from Dutch Population Policy Acceptance Surveys also show a rapid change 
in preferences for different types of relationships (Figure 13). In the early 1990s, the 
majority of the Dutch population (1990–1997: 18 years or older; 2000–2002: 16 years 
or older) preferred to be married directly (i.e., without preceding cohabitation). Since 
the mid-1990s, an increasing number of people have preferred unmarried cohabitation, 
followed by marriage. In 2000, 55% of the Dutch population would opt for this type of 
relationship if they were free to choose (once again); only 18% wished to be married 
directly. The sudden decline in the popularity of direct marriage has probably to do with 
a change in preferences among the older married cohorts who initially considered the 
trend of unmarried cohabitation as negative. The increasing prevalence of starting a 
relational career with a period of cohabitation in the mid-1990s might have convinced 
them to opt for this relationship form if they were free to choose once again (Esveldt et 
al. 2001: 26). Figure 13 also shows a gradual increase in the proportion of Dutch people 
who either prefer cohabitation without subsequent marriage (from 6% in 1990 to 12% 
in 2002) or a LAT (Living apart together)-relationship (from 6% in 1990 to 10% in 
2002). Having no steady partner at all remains to be an unpopular option. In 2002, only 
3% of the Dutch population showed a preference to have no steady partner relationship.  
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Figure 13:  Preferences for different types of relationships, the Netherlands,  

























Source: Population Policy Acceptance Surveys (own calculations) 
 
 
Figures of the Family and Fertility Survey 2003 show that adults who are in a 
partner  relationship  but  who  are  not  cohabiting  with  their  partner  are  the  majority 
among the youngest age groups. The majority of them intend to live with their partner 
in the future. Around 20% of persons aged 30–60 are in a steady relationship but do not 
live  together  with  their  partner.  Around  40%  of  them  have  no  intention  of  living 
together and thus prefer to have a LAT-relationship. It is in particular women aged 40+ 
who prefer a LAT-relationship. A substantial share of them is divorced and has children 
from a previous relationship (De Graaf and Loozen 2004).  
 
 
3.3 Mean age at first marriage  
The age at which young adults start to live with a partner declined between the cohorts 
born in 1900 and 1960; for the cohorts born since 1961 the age has increased. However, 
the rise is much less pronounced than the increase in the age at first marriage. Thus, Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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although younger cohorts postpone marriage, they do not delay much their entry into 
cohabiting union (Liefbroer and Dykstra 2000).  
The mean age of women at first marriage has been increasing steadily since the 
early 1980s (Figure 14). On average, in 1980 a Dutch woman married for the first time 
at the age of 23.2. In 2004, the average age was 28.7 years. The trend is similar to 
trends seen in the mean age at first birth (see Figure 6).  
 
 



















Delays in entering a married union have also contributed to a decline in marriage 
rates between 1975 and 1985. Since the mid-1980s, the total first marriage rate for 
women below the age of 50 has hardly been changing in spite of the continuing rise in 
the age at first marriage (Figure 15). The introduction of registered partnership in 1998 
hardly  affected  the  number  of  marriages.  Although  the  majority  of  registered 
partnerships were contracted by couples of opposite sex, partnership registration was 
popular among couples of the same sex as it was the option for them to register their 
relationship officially. The number of partnership registrations of same-sex couples fell Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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after  1  April  2001,  the  date  homosexual  couples  can  officially  marry.  Since  then, 
between 2 and 3% of all new marriages have been marriages between two men or two 
women. The introduction of same-sex marriages, however, did not prevent the total 
number of marriages from decreasing rapidly.  
 
 
Figure 15:  Total female first marriage rate (<50 completed years) and total  




















































Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
 
3.4 Divorce  
Not  only  marriage  as  an  institution  but  also  its  durability  is  taken  less  for  granted 
nowadays. For people married in 1970, divorce was rather exceptional; the likelihood to 
divorce was 12%. For the most recent marriage cohorts, the percentage is assumed to be 
between 25 and 30 (De Jong 1999). Between 1965 and 1985, the annual number of 
divorces in the Netherlands rose from 6000 to more than 34,000. The Dutch divorce 
rates skyrocketed from 7 per 100 marriages in 1965 to 41 per 100 marriages in 2001 
(Figure 15). Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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As Van Poppel and De Beer (1993) showed, the rapid increase of divorce in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s is partly related to the liberalization of the Divorce Act in 
1971.  If  both  parties  sign  a  petition  declaring  that  they  think  the  marriage  has 
irreversibly failed, divorce is granted automatically
6. The legal change resulted in a 
normalization of divorce in Dutch society. This does not mean, however, that the Dutch 
population views the increasing number of divorces as desirable. Recent data from the 
Dutch Population Policy Acceptance Surveys show quite the reverse (Figure 16). In 
2002, for example, more than 80% considered the trend of divorce as bad or very bad. 
This percentage has hardly changed since 1990.  
 
Figure 16:  Opinion on the increasing number of divorces, the Netherlands,  
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Source: Population Policy Acceptance Surveys (own calculations) 
                                                            
6 Prior to this legislation, married couples could only obtain a divorce if both parties gave their consent and if 
they could prove the marriage had irretrievably failed on one of the following four grounds: adultery, physical 
assault or ill-treatment, desertion with malicious intent of five or more years, or a prison sentence of four or 
more years imposed after the marriage took place. The new Act made it possible for couples to jointly petition 
for divorce without having to prove any of the above grounds. The net result of the Act was that it lifted 
divorce out of the realms of guilt and shame. Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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The  rise  in  divorce  is  partially  attributable  to  the  steady  rise  in  educational 
attainment and female labor-force participation (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2), which eroded 
the binding attributes of the traditional gender division within marriage and reduced the 
so-called exit costs (Becker 1981). Many studies have reported partial or full support 
for this, the so-called economic independence hypothesis (see e.g., Brines and Joyner 
1999, Trussell et al. 1992). Dutch research, however, produced only empirical evidence 
for the economic independence hypothesis among older cohorts of women (Fokkema 
and Liefbroer 2004). Women’s greater economic independence does not seem to play 
an important role in divorce decisions among the younger cohorts in the Netherlands 
(Poortman 2002). This has probably to do with the expansion of the welfare state since 
the 1960s. In 1971, a few years after the introduction of the General Social Security 
Act,  divorced  non-working  women  were  also  given  entitlement  to  the  minimum  of 
financial support provided by the State (social security benefits). This meant that they 
were no longer economically dependent on their former partners (Van den Akker 1984). 
Divorce has therefore also become an option for women who devote all of their time to 
homemaking and childrearing. This is not to say, however, that managing on social 
security benefits alone is an easy task for one-parent families (Corpeleijn et al. 1998). 
Since the mid-1980s, the number of divorces has more or less stabilized, varying 
between 28,000 (1987 and 1988) and 37,000 (2001). The reason most often mentioned 
is the rapid popularity of cohabitation which started in the 1970s (see Section 3.2). 
People  in  unmarried  cohabitation  are  more  likely  to  separate  than  married  people. 
Consequently, the least stable relationships are dissolved before it comes to marriage. In 
addition,  although  cohabitation  effectively  amounts  to  a  “trial  marriage”,  previous 
studies  show  that  marriages  are  more  stable  among  couples  who  did  not  cohabit 
previously (see e.g., Fokkema and Liefbroer 2004, Lillard et al. 1995). The rationale is 
that  married  couples  who  do  cohabit  prior  to  getting  married  have  less  traditional 
attitudes (Axinn and Barber 1997). 
From 2001 onwards, the number of divorces fell again, from 37,000 in 2001 to 
31,000 in 2004. This decrease, however, is largely counterbalanced by a rising number 
of divorces according to an accelerated procedure, so-called flash annulments (Figure 
17). A flash annulment, introduced into the Dutch legal system on 1 April 2001, makes 
it possible to end a marriage without a formal divorce. In a formal divorce procedure, 
the partners have to appear in court. In a flash annulment procedure, a couple mutually 
decides to downgrade their marriage to a registered partnership. Apportionment of joint 
property and the granting of alimony are settled in an agreement. The partnership is 
subsequently annulled by a solicitor or notary; intervention by the court is unnecessary. 
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Figure 17:  Annual number of divorces and flash annulments,  



























A recent study of Kalmijn and Gelissen (2002) has shown that divorced women 
and, lesser so, divorced men who have a child from an earlier marriage and who are 
remarried are less likely to have another child in their second union than those who are 
remarried without bringing a prior child into that union. These findings are similar to 
results on France and Austria (Toulemon 1997, Buber and Prskawetz 2000) but differ 
from the findings for Sweden and the United Kingdom (Vikat et al. 1999, Jefferies et al. 
2000). The study further shows that remarried women without a prior child are more 
likely to have a child than first married women. So it seems that remarried women are 
“catching  up”  on  missed  fertility  opportunities  in  their  first  marriage.  Their  total 
fertility, however, remains lower as a result of age restrictions, indicating that divorce 
has a negative effect on subsequent fertility. 
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4. Family planning  
4.1 Contraception  
Up to the 1960s, family planning was taboo in Dutch society as it was regarded contrary 
to the objectives of marriage and as promoting promiscuity. Thus, it was forbidden to 
sell or advertise contraceptives. The situation changed spectacularly between 1965 and 
1975. Within a decade, family planning  gained increasing acceptance, prompted by 
concerns  about  the  prospect  of  overpopulation  (see  Section  6.1).  In  1969,  the 
government  removed  the  statutory  prohibition  on  contraceptives;  in  1971, 
contraceptives were covered by national health insurance, resulting in the widespread 
use  of  them.  Two  years  later,  sterilization  was  added  to  the  coverage.  In  addition, 
special family planning clinics became eligible for government  grants. So,  within a 
short space of time, reliable use of birth control has become common practice in the 
Netherlands. 
The proponents of the Second Demographic Transition have repeatedly stressed 
the catalytic role of modern contraception in the behavioral and cultural change that 
characterizes  this  transition  (Sobotka  2004).  Modern  contraception  has  facilitated 
fertility  postponement  and  has  opened  up  opportunities  for  new  aspirations  to  be 
fulfilled prior to parenthood (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002: 333). Van de Kaa (1994: 114) 
links  increased  contraceptive  use  with  changes  in  living  arrangements  and  intimate 
relations.  Thanks  to  efficient  contraception,  women  are  able  to  have  sexual 
relationships  without  the  fear  of  unwanted  and  “mistimed”  pregnancies  and  births. 
Furthermore, Beets et al. (2001: 21) have aptly pointed out that in the Netherlands 
modern  contraception  has  changed  the  obvious  perception  of  “having  children” 
(kinderen krijgen) to decision-making as to whether or not to “take children” (kinderen 
nemen). 
In  2003,  two-thirds  of  all  Dutch  women  aged  between  18  and  45  used 
contraceptives. About 8% was pregnant or wanted to become pregnant, 8% was infertile 
and only 17% did not use any kind of contraceptive method. Detailed analyses reveal 
that it is mainly females without a (steady male) partner or with a partner with whom 
they do not live who do not rely on contraception. 
The pill, the most efficient contraceptive method, is by far the most widely used 
method  of  contraception  in  the  Netherlands;  (voluntary)  sterilization,  IUDs,  and 
condoms only play a  minor  role. From the early 1980s onwards, the percentage of 
women using the pill increased yearly, from 27 in 1981 to around 45 in 1994. After that 
it decreased slightly to 41 percent in 2003. The slight decline in recent years is caused 
by an amendment to national health coverage: Since 1 January 2004, the pill is no 
longer funded for women aged 22 years and above. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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The pill is especially popular among “younger” women: As we see in Figure 18, 
the percentage of women who use the pill increases steeply, from 40% starting at the 
age of 16 to 75% among 22-year-olds. After this age, it decreases gradually to around 
15% of women aged 49 years. Obviously, the decline in pill use is strongly related to 
the desire to start a family. Once women have completed their family, they often switch 
to other forms of contraception, such as IUD or sterilization. However, because women 
enter motherhood later in life (see Section 2.3), sterilization has gradually shifted to an 
older age over time: The proportion of women born in the late 1960s who are either 
sterilized or have a sterilized partner is smaller than the corresponding proportion of 
women born in the 1950s or early 1960s (see Figure 19). 
 
 
























Source: Statistics Netherlands  
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Figure 19:  Sterilized women and women with a sterilized partner,  
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4.2 Abortion  
Due to the sudden widespread acceptance and practice of family planning from the 
second half of the 1960s onwards, abortion assistance was getting under way as well. 
Since 1971, the number of private non-profit clinics that provide safe, reliable abortions 
has increased rapidly, even though abortion at the time was still illegal. Liberalizing the 
abortion  laws  was  a  difficult  process.  The  Termination  of  Pregnancy  Act  was 
eventually enacted in November 1984; however, before then convictions based on the 
old legislation were relatively rare. 
The aim of the Act is to ensure that any decision to terminate pregnancy be given 
careful  consideration,  and  that  the  termination  is  performed  only  if  the  woman’s 
circumstances  leave  no  alternative.  By  law,  women  may  terminate  an  unwanted 
pregnancy within 24 weeks of conception in a hospital or clinic that is licensed to do so. 
However, to be sure they remain within the time limit, most doctors will perform the Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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procedure no later than 21 weeks and a few days into the pregnancy. Women resident in 
the Netherlands are able to obtain an abortion free of charge. The costs of a termination 
are covered by national health insurance.  
 
 
Figure 20:  Number of induced abortions among resident and non-resident  


































Source: Health Care Inspectorate 
 
 
In 1980, 56400 induced abortions (including those induced by abortion pills) were 
performed: Of these, 19700 women were residents in the Netherlands and 36700 were 
not (Figure 20). Since then, the yearly number of abortions has declined considerably, 
e.g., it was down to 29266 in 1997. During 1998–2004, however, the total number of 
abortions increased again, from 30714 to 34168. Nevertheless, the country still has one 
of  the  lowest  abortion  rates  in  the  world  and  this  is  closely  connected  with  the 
widespread use of contraceptives (see Section 4.1): The number of abortions can be 
seen as a mirror of unplanned and unwanted pregnancies. 
The recent increase in the number of abortions is not due to growing numbers of 
abortions performed on non-residents. Just the contrary: As most European countries 
had introduced laws legalizing abortion by 1986, there has been a steady decline in the Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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number of women from other European countries who come to the Netherlands for an 
abortion (Figure 20). Neither is it fully attributable to an increasing number of women 
at fertile ages (15–44), since the abortion rate (the total number of abortions divided by 
the number of women aged 15–44) has risen as well: from 6.5 in 1997 to 8.7 in 2002 
per 1000 women. 
The main inter-related explanatory factors of the recent increase in abortions are: 
less effective use of contraception compared to previous years, a declining number of 
men and women in the “older” fertility age groups who are sterilized (Arnolds et al. 
2000,  De  Graaf  1998),  growing  numbers  of  young  women  who  do  not  use 
contraception at all (Beerthuizen 2003, De Graaf 1998), and an increasing share of 
well-known risk groups: teenagers and women from ethnic minorities. About 15 of 100 
women who terminate a pregnancy are younger than 20 years of age. In addition, some 
60%  of  abortion  clients  have  an  ethnic  minority  background.  Roughly  30%  of  this 
group originates from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles, 15% are of Turkish or 
Moroccan  origin,  and  the  remaining  55%  originate  from  other  countries  in  Africa, 
Europe, and Asia. The abortion rate of the four main ethnic minority groups (Suriname, 
the Netherlands Antilles, Turkey and Morocco) is between three and almost ten times 
higher than that of the rest of the Dutch population. 
Although  the  abortion  rate  among  teenagers  is  extremely  low  by  international 
standards and although it is also below the abortion rate of other women of reproductive 
age, the Dutch government takes the problem very seriously. Sex education is now an 
important  issue  in  schools,  and  special  services  are  available  for  teenagers.  Special 
attention is also given to ethnic minorities. Over the past 15 years, family planning 
research in the Netherlands has specifically targeted the Surinamese, Antillean, Turkish, 
and Moroccan communities. 
 
 
5. Social and cultural conditions  
5.1 Education  
The educational level of the Dutch population has increased substantially since the early 
20
th  century.  Among  people  born  1925–1934,  only  a  third  had  merely  a  primary 
education; this corresponds to only 7% for the 1965–1974 cohorts. At the same time, 40 
and 74% of the respective cohorts had at least gained a medium level of education 
(Vogels  2005).  The  educational  level  of  women  in  particular  has  increased. 
Nevertheless, the overall educational level of men is still somewhat higher than that of 
women. At the same time, women participating in the labor force are slightly higher 
educated than working men (CBS 2005).  Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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Cohort  analyses  by  Liefbroer  and  Dykstra  (2000)  show  that  higher  educated 
women have a first child at a much higher age than the less educated. This difference 
increased  among  the  younger  female  cohorts.  Figure  21  shows  an  overview  of  the 
median ages at first birth for women with different educational levels by cohort. The 
rising age at childbirth started and is strongest among the higher educated women. It is 
often suggested that the lower educated follow this pattern.  
The  ultimate  family  size  differs  by  women’s  educational  level  as  well.  While 
women from the 1960–1964 cohort with a low or medium level of education have an 
average  family  size  of  1.9  and  1.8,  respectively,  women  with  the  highest  level  of 
education  have  on  average  1.6  children.  The  smaller  family  size  among  the  highly 
educated women is mainly caused by a higher percentage of childlessness: 29 compared 
to 16 (low) and 18 (medium), respectively.  
 
 
Figure 21:  Age at which 50% of women had a first child per educational level  























Source: Liefbroer & Dykstra, 2000, p. 105 
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The  literature  provides  different  explanations  on  these  fertility  differentials  by 
educational level:  One of the explanations is that  higher educated  women postpone 
childbearing and are more reluctant to start a family because it is difficult to combine a 
career with motherhood. As higher educated women made substantial investments in 
their education, they are held to be more strongly attached to career building, leading to 
higher “opportunity costs” of having a child (Liefbroer 2005). Another view holds that 
individuals with higher education are less resistant to normative pressures and embrace 
values such as independence and personal autonomy (De Feijter 1991). Yet another 
explanation  is  that  higher  educated  women  spent  a  substantial  period  of  time  in 
education, thus resulting in a higher age at which family formation is started (Beets 
2004,  Liefbroer  and  Corijn  1999,  Liefbroer  and  Dykstra  2000).  Beets  et  al.  (2001) 
estimates that an increase in the educational level explains about half of the rise in the 
mean age at first birth among Dutch women born 1931–1940 and 1961–1965. 
 
 
5.2 Female labor-force participation  
The  labor-force  participation  of  women  in  the  Netherlands  has  risen  substantially, 
starting  from  the  mid-1960s.  Until  then,  there  was  a  clear  division  of  tasks  among 
couples: Men were bread-winners and women were homemakers. Figure 22 shows the 
development of the labor-force participation of men and  women aged 15–64 in the 
period  1960–2005.  The  increase  in  the  educational  level  of  women,  emancipation, 
wider child-care facilities, and the rising number of part-time jobs all contributed to the 
growing  numbers  of  women  participating  in  the  labor  market.  In  2005,  half  of  all 
women aged 15–64 had a paid job compared to 75% of men.  
At  the  international  level,  female  labor-force  participation  was  very  low  in  the 
Netherlands for many decades. Today, the proportion of Dutch women participating in 
the labor market does not diverge from the European average. In two respects, however, 
current  labor  conditions  in  the  Netherlands  differ  from  those  in  other  European 
countries  (see  Table  1).  One  difference  is  the  high  proportion  of  employees  with 
flexible working hours. Another difference is the high proportion of women with a part-
time job, resulting from the “Dutch Poldermodel” (see above). In the 1980s and 1990s, 
working times were reduced by early retirement, longer holidays, and an increase of 
part-time work. Since many young mothers prefer to take care of their children at least 
several days a week, the availability of part-time jobs offered them the possibility to 
combine  having  a  job  and  having  children.  Consequently,  although  a  substantial 
proportion  of  couples  in  the  Netherlands  are  dual  earners,  one-and-a-half  earner 
households are predominant among couples with children. Whereas most men continue 
to work full-time after first childbirth, many women decide to work fewer hours. Of all Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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working women with children, around a third had a paid job for 12 to 19 hours and 
around 50% did so for 20 to 34 hours a week in 2002 (Alders et al. 2003). Still, among 
35%  of  30-year-old  women  with  children  and  their  partners,  the  male  was  the 
breadwinner  and  the  female  the  homemaker  in  2000  (Garssen  et  al.  2001).  The 
traditional gender roles differ by educational level: Among the lower educated women, 
participation is lower than among the higher educated women. This pattern is more 
pronounced after the birth of a first child. 
 
 
Figure 22:  Labor-force participation of men and women (age 15–64),  





















































Source: Labour Force Survey 
 
 
The emancipation and growing labor-force participation among women since the 
1960s has also affected attitudes towards  women’s labor-force participation and the 
division of housework. While in 1965, 84% of the Dutch population objected to married 
women with school-age children having a paid job, this percentage dropped to 29 in 
1985 (SCP 1986: 381). In 1981, 6 of 10 agreed that a paid job and household work have 
to be shared equally by the man and woman (SCP 1986). Today, about 70% of the 
Dutch population is of the opinion that couples should share household responsibilities. Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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However, Keuzenkamp and Oudhof (2000) note that Dutch women, including those 
who have a paid job, still tend to take on  most of the housework and child caring 
responsibilities, this despite the egalitarian gender role attitudes (Alders et al. 2003). 
 
 
5.3 Business cycle and swings in period fertility  
The TPFR shows short-term fluctuations that are affected by the business cycle. People 
become more optimistic in times of economic upturn. This is measured by an increase 
in the index of consumer confidence. When the index rises, the TPFR increases after a 
time lag of about two years. Similarly, a decline in consumer confidence is followed by 




Table 1:  Flexible working hours and part-time jobs in several  
  Western European countries 
 
  % of employees with 
flexible working hours 
% of women having  
a part-time job 
Austria  22  21 
Belgium  26  21 
Denmark  25  18 
Finland  22  6 
France  26  15 
Germany  33  27 
Greece  23  2 
Ireland  19  17 
Italy  19  11 
Netherlands  36  45 
Portugal  20  5 
Spain  20  8 
Sweden  32  20 
United Kingdom  32  30 
 
 
Since 1975, the TPFR twice has seen a periodic decline and increase. Between 
1975 and 1983, it fell from 1.66 to 1.47, followed by a rise to 1.62 in 1990, a drop to 
1.53 in 1996, and another rise to 1.75 in 2003 (see Table 2). The table shows that in 
times of decreasing consumer confidence, the fertility of women younger than 30 years Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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dropped more steeply than in times of rising confidence. The fertility of women aged 30 
or over, however, climbed only slowly in periods of decreasing confidence and rose 
strongly in periods with a positive economic climate. This clearly shows that changes in 
the timing of fertility are affected by the business cycle: When people are pessimistic, 
they  tend  to  postpone  having  children  until  they  become  more  optimistic  and  then 
“catch up”.  
Changes in the level of confidence affect first births as well as second-order births, 
but have less impact on higher-order births. Table 2 shows that in pessimistic periods, 
first  and  second-order  births  declined,  whereas  they  rose  in  times  of  economic 
optimism. The extent of the effects is estimated on the basis of regression analysis. It 
turns out that a rising index of consumer confidence by 10 points is followed by an 
increase in the TFR by .04, half of which can be attributed to a rise in first birth and the 
other to an increase in second-order birth.  
 
Table 2:  TPFR and its relationship with the index of consumer confidence  
 
 






















rd or more 
children 
   
1975  1.66  1.19  0.47  0.71  0.65  0.31  114   
1983  1.47  0.95  0.51  0.63  0.52  0.31  78   
1990  1.62  0.84  0.77  0.72  0.56  0.34  103   
1996  1.53  0.66  0.86  0.70  0.55  0.28  98   
2003  1.75  0.72  1.03  0.83  0.63  0.29  115   
  changes               
1975–
1983 
–0.19  –0.24  0.04  –0.08  –0.13  0.00  –36  –0.08 
1983–
1990 
0.15  –0.11  0.26  0.09  0.04  0.03  25  0.09 
1990–
1996 
–0.09  –0.18  0.09  –0.02  –0.01  –0.06  –5  –0.03 
1996–
2003 
0.22  0.06  0.17  0.13  0.08  0.01  17  0.13 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 23 shows that the changes in the TPFR over the last 30 years are described 
rather accurately by the regression model, the latter which explains the TPFR by the 
level  of  consumer  confidence.  The  relationship  between  the  TPFR  and  consumer 
confidence seems to have changed over time. Both the length of the time lag and the 
level of the regression coefficient seem to have changed. The time lag seems to be Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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smaller in the first two sub-periods than it is in the last two periods. In the last period, 
however, the relation between the amount of the change in the TPFR and that in the 
index seems to be different than in the other periods. For this reason, in the regression 
model the TPFR in the first two sub-periods is explained by the level of consumer 
confidence lagging one year, whereas in the last period, the lag is two years. The last 
column of Table 2 indicates that the changes in the index explain about half of the 
changes in the TPFR in the four sub-periods. 
 
 









































Source: Statistics Netherlands, own calculations 
 
 
5.4 The impact of immigration  
The  Dutch  TPFR  is  currently  one  of  the  highest  in  Europe  owing  to  fertility 
stabilization since the 1980s and a slight recovery since 1995. In 2004, the Netherlands 
ranked seventh among the 25 EU countries, with a TPFR of 1.73 (0.24 above the EU 
average). It is interesting to examine whether the TPFR, rather high compared to other 
EU countries, is related to a rising proportion of migrants in the total Dutch population. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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Over  the  last  three  decades,  the  migrant  population  in  the  Netherlands  more  than 
doubled, i.e., from 1.3 million (9.2%) in 1972 to 3.1 million (19.2%) in 2005. Half of 
this group consisted of foreign-born migrants (first generation) and the other half was 
made up of children from these migrants, who were themselves born in the Netherlands 
(second generation). Around 1.5 million of the current migrants in the Netherlands are 
of  non-western  origin.  Of  these,  roughly  two-thirds  are  of  Turkish,  Moroccan, 
Surinamese or Antillean/Aruban descent. The first two groups started to arrive in the 
1960s as labor immigrants to alleviate labor shortages in the booming Dutch economy. 
In the 1970s, a new immigration flow from these countries set in as the initial labor 
migrants reunified with their families in the Netherlands. Starting from the second half 
of the 1980s, family formation of new families became an important reason behind 
immigration from these countries. Also today, young people from Morocco and Turkey 
move to the Netherlands to marry migrants already living there. Most of the Surinamese 
migrants arrived in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1970s and the beginning of 
1980, i.e., around the time when Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands. 
The Dutch Antilles and Aruba are still part of the kingdom of the Netherlands. As a 
result, no immigration restrictions apply. Migration from the Antilles to the Netherlands 
has  traditionally  taken  place  for  educational  reasons.  More  recently,  limited 
employment opportunities in the Antilles prompted many young adults to leave for the 
Netherlands (Van Leusden 2001). Migrant births account for a substantial share of all 
births in the Netherlands; e.g., in 2004, about a quarter of all newborns had a mother 
with a migrant background. 
Several studies on the Netherlands and on other western countries have shown that 
fertility  is  considerably  higher  among  migrant  women,  more  particularly  first 
generation migrants originating from non-western countries (Coleman 1994, De Valk et 
al. 2004, Lodewijckx et al. 1997). This is documented in Table 3 which provides the 
TPFRs of migrant women living in the Netherlands, by country of birth for 1999 (the 
most recent figures available for such a wide range of countries). All migrant women 
are found to have higher TPFRs than women born in the Netherlands. Women born in 
Iran are the only exception, as their TPFR is 1.1 children and thus lower than the 1.6 
children for Dutch-born women.  
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Table 3:  TPFR by country of birth of the mother, 1999, and number  
  (absolute, x 1,000 and, in brackets, %) of women aged 15–29  
  and 30–49, by country of birth, 2005 
 
  TPFR, 1999  Total 
    15–29  30–49  15–49 
Native Dutch  1.6  1089.6  (75.0)  1972.6   (79.5)  3062.2   (77.8) 
Western migrants    128.5   (8.8)  243.8   (9.8)  372.3   (9.5) 
Non-western 
migrants 
  235.1   (16.2)  264.1   (10.6)  499.3   (12.7) 
Suriname  1.7  42.5   (2.9)  62.4   (2.5)  104.9   (2.7) 
Turkey  2.5  50.0   (3.4)  52.7   (2.1)  102.6   (2.6) 
Morocco  3.3  47.1   (3.2)  38.7   (1.6)  85.8   (2.2) 
Antilles/Aruba  1.8  19.8   (1.4)  19.6   (0.8)  39.4   (1.0) 
China  2.8  8.2   (0.6)  6.7   (0.3)  14.9   (0.4) 
Iraq  3.4  4.5   (0.3)  6.0   (0.2)  10.6   (0.3) 
Afghanistan  2.3  4.8   (0.3)  4.6   (0.2)  9.4   (0.2) 
Iran  1.1  3.5   (0.2)  5.0   (0.2)  8.5   (0.2) 
Somalia  4.4  2.9   (0.2)  2.8   (0.1)  5.6   (0.1) 
Total    1453.3    2480.5    3933.8   
 
of which:  1st generation  2nd generation 
  15–29  30–49  15–49  15–29  30–49  15–49 
Native Dutch             
Western migrants  55.5  114.5  170.0  73.0  129.3  202.3 
Non-western migrants  130.6  246.7  377.3  104.5  17.4  121.9 
Suriname  14.8  55.6  70.4  27.7  6.8  34.5 
Turkey  22.5  50.0  72.5  27.4  2.7  30.2 
Morocco  24.2  37.4  61.5  23.0  1.3  24.3 
Antilles/Aruba  12.6  16.5  29.1  7.3  3.1  10.3 
China  6.7  6.2  12.9  1.6  0.5  2.0 
Iraq  4.4  6.0  10.4  0.1  0.0  0.2 
Afghanistan  4.7  4.6  9.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Iran  3.2  4.9  8.1  0.2  0.0  0.3 
Somalia  2.8  2.8  5.6  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Total  186.1  361.2  547.3  177.5  146.7  324.3 
 
Source: De Valk et al., 2004, Statistics Netherlands. Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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Figure 24 gives an overview of the changes in the TPFR of first generation migrant 
women from the four largest non-western countries and for the Dutch population as a 
whole over the 1980–2004 period. The figure shows that the TPFR of migrant women 
compared  to  the  total  population  declined:  While  the  TPFR  of  Dutch  women  rose 
slightly, the TPFR of non-western migrants decreased. The modest rise in the TPFR is 
the result of the fact that many Dutch women delayed childbearing in the 1985–1995 
period. 
The  TPFR  of  Surinamese  and  Antillean/Aruban  women  in  the  Netherlands  is 
around 1.75. Their TPFR hardly changes over time and is comparable to that among 
native  Dutch  women.  Much  higher  TPFR  levels  are  found  among  first  generation 
Turkish  and  Moroccan  women.  Nevertheless,  the  TPFR  among  the  two  groups  has 
clearly declined since the 1980s. In 1980, the TPFR among first generation Moroccan 
women was just over 7, whereas in recent years it has been around 3.3 children. 
 
 















































Source: Garssen & Nicolaas, 2006. 
 Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
780    http://www.demographic-research.org 
One explanation for the higher TPFR of migrant women is that they start to have 
children at younger ages than Dutch women. To get deeper insights into changes in 
fertility behavior among the migrant population, the cohort fertility of the younger and 
older cohorts (restricted to the first generation by country of birth) is shown in Figure 
25  (based  on  Garssen  and  Nicolaas  2006).  The  cohort  fertility  of  the  four  largest 
migrant groups in the Netherlands is considered: Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and 
Antilleans/Arubans.  Overall,  Garssen  and  Nicolaas  (2006)  conclude  that  younger 
cohorts of women have children at a later age than do older cohorts. This conclusion 
holds for women born in the Netherlands as well as for those born in Turkey, Morocco, 
and  Suriname.  Antillean/Aruban  women  are  the  exception,  as  no  clear  shifts  over 
cohorts are evident. 
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Figure 25:  (Continued) TCFR of first generation mothers by country of 
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Among all migrant groups and for all cohorts, the level of childlessness is higher 
among second generation migrant women. For example, whereas at age 25 (year of 
birth: 1975–1979) the majority of first generation Turkish and Moroccan women has 
had  a  child,  the  majority  of  second  generation  women  from  these  groups  is  still 
childless at this age. This indicates that the timing of having children clearly differs 
between first and second generation migrant women. 
So far, we have focused on fertility behavior among different migrant groups and 
Dutch women. In order to assess the impact of the migrant population on total Dutch 
fertility rates, we examined what would have been the TPFR from 1995 onwards if no 
immigration had taken place. Contrary to common expectations, our analyses reveal 
that women with a non-western background have only a limited influence on the TPFR 
in  the  Netherlands  as  a  whole.  They  yield  a  positive  contribution  of  0.06  to  0.08. 
(Figure  26).  This  influence  has  remained  unchanged  in  the  period  1995–2004,  this 
despite  rising  absolute  numbers  of  non-western  migrants.  Redoing  the  analyses  by 
excluding all migrant women (from both western and non-western origin) showed even 
less impact on the total TPFR in the Netherlands. The lower TPFR among western 
women compared to Dutch women is compensated by the (somewhat) higher fertility 
levels  among  non-western  women.  As  a  result,  the  effect  of  excluding  all  migrant 
women reduced the TPFR in 2004 only by 0.03 points. 
Two factors explain the rather limited impact of the migrant population on total 
Dutch fertility levels. First, compared to the total population, the non-western groups 
are still relatively small (see Table 3). Migrant groups with a relatively high TPFR (e.g., 
from Somalia and Iraq) have relatively few women at childbearing ages, making for 
small absolute numbers of births among these groups compared to the total number of 
births in the Netherlands. Second, although the group of second generation migrant 
women aged 15–49 is growing (this applies in particular to Turks and Moroccans), 
most  of  them  are  still  younger  than  30  years  of  age.  As  women  from  the  second 
generation postpone childbearing, many of them have not reached their final number of 
children yet. Hence, although it is expected that they ultimately have less children than 
their mother’s generation (De Valk and Liefbroer 2007), it is likely that the impact of 
immigrant women on the Dutch TPFR will increase in the near future. 
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Figure 26:   TPFR for the total population, for the Dutch population (excluding  





















































6. Family policies  
6.1 The governmental view  
Although an increasing number of European governments are concerned about their 
low fertility rates, the Netherlands along with the Nordic European countries, Germany 
and Belgium, did not consider their present fertility levels too low (United Nations 
1998, 2001). In 1976, 7 out of 29 (24%) surveyed European countries reported that their 
present  fertility  level  was  perceived  as  too  low.  In  2001,  17  out  of  the  29  (59%) 
countries were concerned about their fertility level. An increasing number of European 
countries  have  policies  aimed  at  raising  fertility.  While  in  1976,  only  24%  of  the 
surveyed European countries had such policies, 41% did so in 2001, among which are 
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Dutch government has not taken 
pronatalist steps, however. Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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The Dutch lack of concern about low fertility may partly be explained by the fact 
that  the  Dutch  public  and  government  were  concerned  about  the  prospect  of 
overpopulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Coleman and Garssen 2003). In the 
1960s, the Netherlands was one of the most densely populated countries in the world, 
and the population forecasts were alarming. The fear of overcrowding is possibly best 
expressed in the official statement of the Dutch Royal Commission on Population 1977 
(Staatscommissie Bevolkingsvraagstuk 1977) that “termination of  natural population 
growth  is  desirable”,  noting  the  advantages  of  a  more  or  less  stationary  population 
structure. The government agreed that “the perspective of growth coming to an end as a 
consequence of below-replacement fertility is welcomed” (Tweede Kamer der Staten 
Generaal, 1983). Recent and more muted official statements still maintain that “in the 
longer  run  a  stationary  population  is  viewed  as  desirable”  (Government  of  the 
Netherlands 1999: 135). In addition, the Netherlands is probably the only European 
country where, for many subsequent years, a substantial part of the population (29–
37%) would like to see a declining number of inhabitants (Esveldt et al. 2001, Kontula 
and Miettinen 2005). Furthermore, while in many other European countries the majority 
of the population currently perceives the declining number of births as negative, only 
21% of the Dutch population does so (Dorbritz et al. 2005: 6).  
This does not mean, however, that the Netherlands has no specific policies aimed 
at  families.  Just  like  all  other  European  countries,  the  Dutch  government  has 
implemented so-called family-friendly employment policies, i.e. policies that are aimed 
at enabling families to combine work and child care, providing subsidies to families 
with children and special financial measures to assist families with dependent children 
who are struggling financially. The primary aim of these policies, however, is not to 
increase  fertility  but  to  improve  the  well-being  of  families  with  children,  to  allow 
couples to combine family formation with work, and to keep the poorest ones from 
becoming socially excluded. The intended impact on fertility is secondary. Therefore, 
these policies fall under the area of social welfare policy rather than pronatalist policy. 
Table 4 presents a short list of the main current family policy measures in the 
Netherlands.  Here,  we  will  restrict  our  attention  to  three  specific  family  policy 
measures: child allowance, parental leave, and childcare facilities. Subsequently, we 
review  attitudes  among  the  Dutch  population  towards  a  number  of  current  and 
hypothetical  family  policy  measures  and  the  expected  impact  of  these  policies  on 
fertility behavior. 
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Table 4:  Current family policies in the Netherlands 
 
Child allowance:     










related to the number of children 
unrelated to family size 
 
related to the age of the child 
Upper age limit    17 
Discriminating age ranges    0–5, 6–11, 12–17 
Min. level for first child in Euro 
per month (and % of average 
gross earnings) 
  58.87 (2.1) 
Maternity leave:     
Duration  1990–:  16 weeks (female (un)employed persons) 
Compensation    100% 
Paternity leave:     
Duration  2001–:  2 working days within the 4 weeks after the 
day of the birth 
Compensation    100% 
Parental leave:     
Duration  1991–:  6 months 
Compensation    unpaid (some branches offer part of wage) 
Maximum age of child  1997–:  8 years 




equal right to mother and father 
right to take leave in 3 separate periods 
Taxation:     
Tax unit    individual 
Family based tax deductions    tax deductions for children, child care costs 
Childcare:     
% of children –4 yrs in day care  2004:  25 
% of children 4+ yrs in after 
school care 
2004:  6 
Hours per week children –4 yrs 
spent in day care 
2004:  20 
Hours per week children 4+ yrs 
spent in after school care 
2004:  7 
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6.2 Child allowance  
Until 1946, means-tested child allowance was provided in the Netherlands. Ever since, 
all families with children have been entitled to receive child allowance. The Population 
and Policy Acceptance Survey 2002 shows that the majority of the Dutch population is 
not content with the current system of income-unrelated child allowance, however: 43% 
prefers  a  scheme  that  varies  with  family  income  and  11%  like  to  see  that  child 
allowances are only paid to low-income families (Fokkema and Esveldt 2006). 
Children are not treated equally. Since 1983, the benefit level has been increasing 
with the child’s age. This is in line with the statistics showing that the costs of children 
have risen with the age of the child (Kontula and Miettinen 2005). Discriminating age 
limits are set at ages 6 and 12, and child allowance is paid up to the age of 17. Until 
1995, in order to provide greater support to larger families than to one-child families, 
child allowance was also increased according to family size: the greater the family size, 
the higher the benefit level for each child. Consequently, from 1995 onwards, there 
have been two different child allowance schemes in operation in the Netherlands: Child 
benefit  for  children  born  before  1995  is  paid  according  to  the  age  and  number  of 
children; for children born since 1995, the amount of allowance depends solely on the 
age of the child. It seems that the Dutch government has succeeded in convincing the 
public of the benefits of the recent change in the allowance: the majority of the Dutch 
population prefers child allowance to rise with the age of the child, i.e., an allowance 
that is not dependent on the number of children (Fokkema and Esveldt 2006). 
The minimum level for the first child is nearly 60 euro per month. Unlike many 
other  Europeans,  the  majority  of  the  Dutch  are  satisfied  with  the  amount  of  child 
allowance they receive: 59% finds the level of allowances as reasonable versus 41% 
who state that the received level of benefit is too low (Fokkema and Esveldt 2006). The 
relatively high level of GDP and socio-economic welfare in the Netherlands possibly 
explains the positive assessment of the allowance level. 
 
 
6.3 Parental leave  
Around childbirth, women in the Netherlands have a legal entitlement to take 16 weeks 
of maternal leave. Most often, the period is split up into six weeks before and ten weeks 
after delivery. Thereafter parents are entitled to apply for parental leave. It is unpaid, 
although trade-union agreements may provide for some pay. 
The duration of parental leave in the Netherlands equals the number of working 
hours per week multiplied by 13. For example, a person who has a full-time job may 
work half time for six months. This seems to be enough, according to the majority Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
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(61%) of the Dutch population (Fokkema and Esveldt 2006). The underlying motive for 
the Dutch government to implement parental leave on a part-time basis is to encourage 
part-time  work rather than to encourage an interruption  of  mothers’ employment in 
order to reconcile the conflicting roles in- and outside the household. Parental leave can 
be taken until the child is 8 years old. Since the introduction of the Flexible Parental 
Leave policy, parents are legally entitled to take parental leave in three separate periods. 
These part- and flexible-time regulations correspond quite well with the preferences of 
the Dutch population: Whereas 42% are in favor of part-time leave and 38% support 
flexible-time leave, only 21% prefer full-time leave. Agreeing with the latter statement 
suggests  that  the  attachment  to  the  labor  market  outweighs  the  benefits  of  parents 
themselves looking after their children, which may be a less attractive option in periods 
of considerable uncertainties in terms of employment/unemployment and government 
support  for  families,  even  more  so  (or  especially)  when  there  are  young  children 
(Gauthier 1998). Finally, in line with the EC Directive on parental leave, entitlement to 
parental  leave  constitutes  a  social  right  for  both  mothers  and  fathers.  In  addition, 
mothers  and  fathers  have  the  same  number  of  months  in  terms  of  parental-leave 
entitlements and they can share the leave as they wish. 
 
 
6.4 Childcare  
For a long time, childcare in the Netherlands was perceived to be mainly an individual 
responsibility. Only since the early 1990s has public provision of childcare become 
more common. From then onwards, the policies on childcare have aimed at sharing 
responsibility between the government, employers, and employees (parents) (Den Dulk 
2001). In 2005, a new childcare act introduced shared and equal responsibility between 
the  government,  employers,  and  employees  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  childcare.  The 
government’s  financial  contribution  depends  on  the  parental  income.  Ideally,  the 
employer  would  contribute  towards  the  childcare  costs  of  both  male  and  female 
employees; however, employers were not obliged to do so. Since 2007, the government 
has been paying a third of the actual childcare costs and an income-dependent share of 
the costs. 
In 2004, 25% of 0–3-year-olds and 6% of 4–12-year-olds were enrolled in day care 
and after-school care. In total, 42% of working women with children aged up to 4 used 
these  formal  childcare  facilities.  Higher  educated  women  use  the  formal  childcare 
provisions most; mothers with a lower and intermediate education more often turn to 
their informal networks. Overall, children aged 0–3 years who attend a day care center 
spend there around 20 hours a week, whereas children in after school care (4–12 years) 
spend 7 hours a week there (Portegijs et al. 2006). Fokkema et al.: The Netherlands: Childbearing within the context of a “Poldermodel” society  
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Although  the  opinion  of  the  Dutch  on  labor-force  participation  is  becoming 
increasingly positive, still 30% of the population believes it to be problematic when a 
woman leaves her child to childcare in order to have a paid job (Gilsing 2007, Portegijs 
et al. 2006).  
 
 
6.5 Preferred family policy measures and their expected impact on reproductive 
behavior  
Which family policy measures do Dutch people prefer to be implemented or improved 
by the government? The Population and Policy Acceptance Survey 2002 shows that 
parents give priority to other family policy measures than childless people do (Fokkema 
and Esveldt 2006). Knowing how expensive children are, Dutch parents accord the 
highest priority to measures aimed at reducing the financial burden of childbearing and 
child  rearing.  This  is  expressed  in  their  choices  of  available  survey  answers:  “A 
substantial rise in child allowance”, “Decreasing the costs of education”, and “Lower 
income tax for people with dependent children”. Childless people, by contrast, attach 
the greatest importance to leave and work arrangements in order to reconcile work with 
family duties (“Flexible working hours for working parents with young children” and 
“More and better opportunities for parents with young children to work part-time”) and 
to child-care facilities for children under the age of 4. 
No more than 17% of parents and 14% of childless people in the Netherlands who 
do not want to have a(nother) child say that they would reconsider the possibility of 
having a(nother) child if the policy measures preferred were introduced or improved by 
the Dutch government. The percentages who state that they would probably decide to 
have an additional child are even lower: 13% and 10%, respectively. Consequently, if 
all of the expressed intentions were put into practice, the total policy effect would range 
from 8 (probably to decide to have a(nother) child) to 13 (reconsider having a(nother) 
child) children per 100 women. Given the low percentages, we may conclude that the 
Dutch do not expect much of the fertility-enhancing effects of governmental family 
policy measures. This may (partly) be explained by the fact that the Dutch consider 
fertility decisions their private domain and  that they do not like a government that 
interferes with their fertility decisions (Esveldt et al. 2001). 
 
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks  
Just like all other European countries, the Netherlands has experienced a considerable 
decline in  fertility. The decline, however, is  not as sharp as in  most other parts of Demographic Research Volume 19, Article 21 
http://www.demographic-research.org   789 
Europe.  While  especially  Southern  and  Central  Eastern  Europe  is  faced  with  a 
persistent and pronounced drop in the TPFR to a current level  well below 1.5, the 
decline  of  the  Dutch  TPFR  came  to  a  halt  and  has  even  slightly  risen  since  1995. 
Consequently, the Netherlands now has one of the highest fertility rates in Europe: 1.73 
children per woman. The business cycle, changes in the Dutch population structure due 
to immigration, and postponement of child bearing are some of the factors that have 
affected the development of the TPFR. It is likely that the Dutch TPFR will rise rather 
than decrease in the near future, given the recent economic upturn, increasing numbers 
of second generation migrant women at childbearing ages, comparatively high fertility 
rates, and the fact that the decline in fertility rates at younger ages has come to an end. 
Dutch women have one of the highest ages at first childbirth in the world: 28.9 
years in 2004. This is not so much due to low fertility rates at young ages. Rather it is 
the result of the relatively high fertility rates of women in their 30s. In addition, the 
Netherlands has one of the most liberal attitudes towards abortion, contraception, and 
sexuality worldwide. Access to abortion has never been severely restricted, there is a 
widespread availability of reliable contraceptives, and the intercourse rate at young ages 
is relatively high. However, since reliable methods of birth control are used widely, the 
Netherlands has one of the lowest abortion and teenage pregnancy rates in the Western 
world. Therefore, childbearing in the Netherlands has increasingly become more salient 
among women in their late 20s and early 30s.  
The Dutch government has never taken pronatalist steps but it has implemented 
family policies, as did other European countries. Besides financial support to families, 
the  measures  are  especially  oriented  towards  enabling  couples  to  combine  family 
formation with a paid job. The emphasis, however, is on women’s employment rather 
than  on  stimulating  fertility.  The  expansion  of  part-time  and  flexible  jobs  and  the 
improvement of child care regulations have encouraged women to participate in the 
labor market, a mode that perfectly fits the “Poldermodel Society”. Considering the 
relatively  high  level  of  fertility  and  the  substantial  rise  in  women’s  labor-force 
participation, the so-called family-friendly employment policy seems to have had its 
desired effect. 
Despite  the  growing  labor-force  participation  of  Dutch  women,  equality  along 
gender lines is far from optimal. Whereas most Dutch men continue to work full-time 
after the birth of their first child, the overwhelming majority of Dutch women exchange 
their full-time job for a part-time job in order to alleviate the double burden; most of the 
household and child care tasks are  still  mostly done by  women,  irrespective of the 
number of working hours. Therefore, the next major challenge is to entice men to take 
more child care responsibilities without this having a negative effect on fertility. 
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